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ABSTRACT 
Technological advancement is widely viewed as an essential 
component to any effective climate change strategy.  However, 
there is no consensus as to the degree to which the law should 
promote technological innovation and development.  This iBrief 
analyzes government involvement in encouraging such technology 
and divides the various policies into four categories.  On one end 
are policies that rely mainly on market forces to encourage 
scientific advancement naturally, requiring minimal government 
involvement.  A second category of policies involves technological 
development promoted indirectly through laws addressing climate 
change generally.  A third type of policy involves directly offering 
government funding and financing for technological research and 
development.  These three methods are currently the most popular 
means of encouraging scientific development in this field.  
Recently, however, there have been increasing calls for major 
government action of the scale of such programs as the Apollo 
Project.  This iBrief classifies such proposals as a fourth category 
of policies encouraging technological solutions to climate change: 
the creation of institutional structures dedicated to bringing about 
rapid, radical technological advancements. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 The world faces an imminent climate crisis.2  Recent reports 
indicate that climate change is occurring at faster rates than previously 
1 Candidate, J.D.-LL.M. program in International & Comparative Law, Duke 
University School of Law, 2009.   B.A., International Relations, Stanford 
University, 2005.  Thanks to Professor Jonathan Wiener for his valuable and 
insightful comments. 
2 E.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 8–10 (2007) (describing 
recent scientific findings showing stronger indications of the existence and 
effects of climate change); NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 2 (2007) (“An overwhelming body of scientific 
evidence now clearly indicates that climate change is a serious and urgent 
issue.”). 
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anticipated.3  Because of this, many experts are calling for a major, 
government-sponsored scientific effort.  Two such proponents, Ted 
Nordhaus and Michael Schellenberger, are calling for a complete shift in 
environmental thinking, and suggest framing climate change “as the result 
of too little clean economic development” rather than as a consequence of 
overdevelopment and over-industrialization.4  Driven by the goal of 
achieving dominance in space within a fixed, short period of time, the 
Apollo Project was an impressive, government-coordinated initiative that 
accelerated technological advance and made travel to the moon possible 
eight years after President Kennedy launched the program.5 
¶2 In their book, Apollo’s Fire, Bracken Hendricks and Congressman 
Jay Inslee argue that the urgency of global warming requires an initiative of 
the same magnitude as the Apollo Project and the space race of the 1960s.6  
In many ways, Hendricks and Inslee’s analogy to climate change is 
convincing.  Cold War security concerns were a major, if not the primary, 
motivation behind the Apollo Project.7  National security was also the main 
driver of a less widely honored, but no less impressive scientific feat: the 
creation of the atomic bomb through the Manhattan Project.8  Even the 
Bush Administration’s Department of Defense has warned of the security 
threats that would result from climate change.9  Nevertheless, in many 
respects climate change is a fundamentally different problem.10  Because of 
                                                     
3 See, e.g., James E. Overland & Muyin Wang, Future Regional Arctic Sea Ice 
Declines, 34 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS L17705, Sept. 8, 2007, at 1; STERN, 
supra note 2, at 8 (“Results from new risk based assessments suggest there is a 
significant chance that the climate system is more sensitive than was originally 
thought.”). 
4 TED NORDHAUS & MICHAEL SCHELLENBERGER, BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE 
DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY 127 (2007) 
(emphasis removed). 
5 Id. at xvii. 
6 JAY INSLEE & BRACKEN HENDRICKS, APOLLO’S FIRE 2–3 (2008). 
7 See, e.g., Roger D. Launius, Historical Dimensions of the Space Age, in SPACE 
POLITICS AND POLICY: AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE 3, 16 (Eligar Sadeh ed., 
2002). 
8 JEFF HUGHES, THE MANHATTAN PROJECT: BIG SCIENCE AND THE ATOM BOMB 
53 (2002). 
9 PETER SCHWARTZ & DOUG RANDALL, AN ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE 
SCENARIO AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY 2 
(2003) (exploring how “an abrupt climate change scenario could potentially de-
stabilize the geo-political environment, leading to skirmishes, battles, and even 
war due to resource constraints”). 
10 See, e.g., Chi-Jen Yang & Michael Oppenheimer, A “Manhattan Project” for 
Climate Change?, 80 CLIMATIC CHANGE 199, 200 (2007) (“Using the 
Manhattan Project as a rhetorical symbol [in the climate change context] might 
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this, commentators have argued that dramatic institutional changes and 
enormous governmental funding may not be the best means of encouraging 
the development of climate change technology.11 
¶3 Much of the climate change policy discussions and proposals in 
recent years have focused on investing in lower risk, more predictable, and 
steadier methods of technological advancement.12  However, there are no 
standard conceptual categories for the types of policies used to encourage 
such advancement.13  This iBrief will attempt to categorize technological 
development relating to climate change as coming from four main sources:  
(1) market-related incentives that will exist with little to no government 
interaction, (2) technological progress indirectly resulting from climate 
change laws, (3) direct government encouragement of private development 
through financial incentives, and (4) the creation of government institutions 
charged with ensuring the development of major technological progress. 
I. NATURAL MARKET INCENTIVES 
¶4 A certain amount of technological progress will inevitably stem 
from economic incentives to cater to a growing market for environmentally 
friendly technology.14  “Perhaps the most powerful force driving today’s 
clean-tech growth is simple economics.  As a general trend, clean-energy 
costs are falling as the costs of fossil fuel energy are going up.”15  With an 
increasing demand for clean technology, there is a growing opportunity to 
make money in green industries.  To a large degree, pure market forces, 
                                                                                                                       
make sense to create a rallying point for the body politic. But good politics is not 
equivalent to wise policy.”). 
11 Id. 
12 See JOHN C. ALIC, DAVID C. MOWERY & EDWARD S. RUBIN, U.S. 
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION POLICIES:  LESSONS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 1 
(2003) (“[I]ncremental innovations . . . are more common, have great 
significance for long-term economic growth, and respond in consistent ways to 
economic signals and public policies. If only because radical innovations are 
uncommon and unpredictable, incremental innovations are the most appropriate 
policy targets.”).  See also infra Parts II and III (explaining that the majority of 
proposed climate change legislation has focused on developing more 
predictable, less revolutionary technology). 
13 See ALIC, MOWERY & RUBIN, supra note 12, at 15 (“Although many types of 
policies affect innovation, no universally accepted nomenclature or taxonomy 
summarizes or describes them.”). 
14 See, e.g., LAWRENCE H. GOULDER, INDUCED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND 
CLIMATE POLICY 3 (Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change 2004) (“The free 
enterprise system encourages technological change by offering significant 
rewards to inventions that yield a competitive advantage in the marketplace.”). 
15 RON PERNICK & CLINT WILDER, THE CLEAN TECH REVOLUTION 6 (2007). 
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existing without any government prodding, will encourage natural 
technological advancement. 
¶5 One clear example of market-driven advances in clean technology 
is the development of solar energy.16  The cost of installing solar panels 
once far outweighed the financial benefits of using solar energy over fossil 
fuels.17  Aware of the potential market, entrepreneurs sought to develop the 
technology necessary to make solar an affordable energy alternative.18  
Progress, largely attributed to private investment, occurred, and solar has 
become an increasingly viable energy source.19  The costs of photovoltaic 
arrays have decreased markedly.20  Furthermore, the fact that solar energy is 
immune from the price fluctuations of fossil fuels (sunlight is free), is a 
major factor in the financial equation.21 
¶6 The technological advances made in solar power were derived 
through private investment and occurred without legal assistance.22  
Nevertheless, the fact that clean technologies are able to develop without 
government influence does not mean that there is no role for lawmakers.23  
There is substantial evidence indicating that laws designed to induce 
technological advancements often serve to increase the rate of technological 
change or reduce the costs of change.24  Were we to have the luxury of 
having the time to allow for the natural market-driven development of clean 
technology, these economic incentives would suffice.  Unfortunately, 
because of the urgency of the situation, some degree of government 
involvement is necessary. 
II. INDIRECT CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE CHANGE LAWS 
¶7 Pure market forces will only go so far in encouraging technological 
advancement.  One easy way for the government to bolster investment in 
new clean technologies is to send policy signals indicating the economic 
value of clean energy.  I refer to this category as “indirect consequences” of 
climate change laws that do not include specific provisions related to 
                                                     
16 INSLEE & HENDRICKS, supra note 6, at 68, 73.  But see NORDHAUS & 
SHELLENBERGER, supra note 4, at 122 (crediting the initial stimulus for solar 
development to government-sponsored incentives). 
17 INSLEE & HENDRICKS, supra note 6, at 68, 73. 
18 Id. at 68. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 PERNICK & WILDER, supra note 15, at 7. 
22 See GOULDER, supra note 14, at 9. 
23 Id. 
24 See id. at 13–16 (describing technical studies concluding that “induced 
technological change” works and often has more efficient results than 
technological change occurring in the absence of public policy). 
2008 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 8 
technological improvement.25  Under this method, the government “pulls” 
technological advance rather than “pushes” it through more direct means.26 
¶8 Climate change laws can indirectly spur technological advancement 
in two major ways.  First, by signaling the value of clean energy, laws can 
encourage private investment in research and development specifically 
aimed at creating new technology.27  Second, the simple increase in 
frequency of clean technology use will lead to technological advance as 
there become greater opportunities for innovation.28 
¶9 Carbon cap-and-trade and carbon taxing are two examples of such 
indirect policies.29  These policies can signal the economic value of 
developing clean technologies, encouraging private investors to pump 
money into research and development.30  By creating laws that regulate 
climate change and restrict the ability to emit carbon, the government 
imposes costs on dirty technologies.  Under such policies, the government 
creates market incentives to develop cheap, carbon-neutral technologies that 
                                                     
25 In their analysis of technology policies, Alic, Mowery, and Rubin lay out two 
separate categories that I essentially collapse into a single “indirect 
consequences of climate change laws” category.  See ALIC, MOWERY & RUBIN, 
supra note 12, at 16.  One of Alic, Mowery, and Rubin’s categories is “a 
collection of policies that directly or indirectly supports commercialization and 
adoption, or indirectly supports development.” Id.  The other consists of 
“policies that foster technology diffusion through information and learning.” Id.  
For the purposes of this iBrief, I do not find it necessary to subdivide this 
category in such a manner. 
26 See GOULDER, supra note 14, at 3–4 (describing how indirect “pull” policies 
“stimulate[] technological change by increasing the reward (cost savings) for 
discovering a process that allows reduced consumption of [dirty] fuels, which 
[become] more expensive”).  “Push” policies are discussed in Parts III and IV, 
infra. 
27 See PERNICK & WILDER, supra note 15, at 247 (stating that “venture 
capitalists ranked policy as their number two reason for investing in clean tech 
in California, and 91% said favorable public policy is a key driver for clean-tech 
business and investing”). 
28 See ALIC, MOWERY & RUBIN, supra note 12, at 14 (“Incremental 
improvements come from multiple sources, many of which, such as learning-by-
doing and learning-by-using, do not depend on formal R&D.”). 
29 Carbon tax policies involve placing a tax on the emission of carbon dioxide.  
Cap-and-trade policies establish a limit on the total amount of carbon dioxide 
allowed to be released into the atmosphere and allotting permits to emit based 
on the limit.  Actors who emit less than their permits allow are able to sell their 
excess allowances to others. 
30 See, e.g., NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 4, at 120–21 (explaining 
how cap-and-trade “could, if done right, generate billions of dollars in private 
investment for cleaner sources of energy”). 
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would not be subject to emissions regulations or taxes.31  The message sent 
to the business community is that clean technologies are insulated from 
these external expenses.  This method of encouraging technological 
innovation does not directly entice scientists and engineers to start 
inventing, but rather indirectly sends the message to investors that clean 
technology is a promising economic industry. 
¶10 Cap-and-trade plans are currently the most popular proposals being 
offered by politicians.  Among 2008 presidential nominees, Barack Obama 
has plans to auction permits for 100% of the nation’s carbon dioxide 
emissions,32 and John McCain also supports a cap-and-trade system.33  
Although McCain has been vague on the details of his plan while on the 
campaign trail,34 as a senator he has authored numerous cap-and-trade 
bills.35 
¶11 Multiple cap-and-trade bills have also been introduced in Congress 
recently.36  Although the exact forms of these proposals differ, the common 
goal is to firmly limit greenhouse gas emissions to create a financial market 
for the ability to emit.   Though not as popular, proposals to place a tax on 
carbon emissions would have similar results on spurring technological 
development by increasing the economic costs of releasing greenhouse 
gases.37 
¶12 Policies that aim to increase the cost of carbon emissions are likely 
the most powerful way to indirectly spur technological advance.  
Nevertheless, other types of laws that address climate change can also have 
                                                     
31 For a brief economic explanation of cap-and-trade and carbon tax policies, see 
Environmental Economics, Econ 101: Carbon Tax vs. Cap-and-Trade, 
http://www.env-econ.net/carbon_tax_vs_capandtrade.html (last visited Oct. 8, 
2008). 
32 Barack Obama, Remarks of Senator Barack Obama: Real Leadership for a 
Clean Energy Future, Oct. 8, 2007, 
http://www.barackobama.com/2007/10/08/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam_2
8.php (last visited Jan. 16, 2008). 
33 Climate Change, http://www.johnmccain.com/ (follow “Issues” dropdown 
box to “Climate Change”) (last visited Sept. 26, 2008). 
34 See id. (merely stating that he “believe[s] "cap and trade" is the best way to 
manage cost and maximize benefits”). 
35 Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005, S. 1151, 109th Cong. 
(2005); Climate Stewardship Act of 2005, S. 342, 109th Cong. (2005); The 
Emission Reductions Incentive Act of 2001, S. 1781, 107th Cong. (2001). 
36 E.g., America’s Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007); 
Global Warming Reduction Act of 2007, S. 485, 110th Cong. (2007); Climate 
Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 280, 110th Cong. (2007). 
37 See, e.g., Save Our Climate Act of 2007, H.R. 2069, 110th Cong. (2007); 
America’s Energy Security Trust Fund Act of 2007, H.R. 3416, 110th Cong. 
(2007). 
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the effect of signaling the value of engaging in technological research.  In 
this regard, many states have taken the lead in implementing innovative 
policies.38  California, in particular, has been the most visible in its efforts 
to tackle climate change.39  In many ways, California has taken 
international leadership regarding climate change, often acting more like a 
nation-state than as a provincial government.40 
¶13 Although the federal government has not been nearly as active as 
the states in trying to establish a climate-conscious culture, a number of 
bills relating to climate change will likely have some impact on the 
development of new technology.  For example, proposals to allow for net 
metering of homes—allowing individuals to put energy into the grid—
would likely encourage advancements in solar technology.41  In addition, 
bills that focus on energy efficiency would probably have the effect of 
encouraging the development of better, more efficient technologies.42  In 
short, just about any policy that aims to reduce the effects of climate change 
can indirectly promote the development of green technology.  By increasing 
the value of clean technology and signaling a long-term lucrative market for 
green industry in the future, climate change laws bolster market incentives 
to invest in clean technology.   
III. DIRECT GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR 
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
¶14 While market forces occurring both naturally and as a result of 
indirect government policies will encourage the development of many green 
                                                     
38 The Environmental Protection Agency maintains a website detailing state 
responses to climate change.  See EPA, Global Warming Actions: State, 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/ActionsState.html (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2008). 
39 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 399.11–399.20 (West 2007) (requiring 
that a certain level of energy production must come from renewable sources).  
40 See, e.g., Press Release, Gov. Schwarzenegger, British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair Sign Historic Agreement to Collaborate on Climate Change, Clean Energy, 
July 31, 2006, http://gov.ca.gov/index.php/press-release/2770/ (last visited Jan. 
31, 2008).  
41 See Solar Opportunity and Local Access Rights Act, H.R. 2848, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (providing for the establishment of net metering to “promote energy 
independence and self-sufficiency”); Solar Opportunity and Local Access Rights 
Act, S. 1016, 110th Cong. (2007) (providing for the establishment of net 
metering to promote efficiency). 
42 See, e.g., Energy Efficiency Improvement Act, H.R. 3236, 110th Cong. 
(2007); Smart Grid Facilitation Act of 2007, H.R. 3237, 110th Cong. (2007) 
(establishing a more energy efficient grid called a “smart grid”); Federal Agency 
Environmental Responsibility Act, S. 1072, 110th Cong. (2007) (requiring 
greater efficiency in federal buildings). 
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technologies that offer low-risk returns, more radical technological 
advancements are needed to fully address climate change.  The previous 
two methods will not encourage investment in instances in which high 
initial start-up costs and high risks of low economic return may hinder the 
development of certain technologies.43  One method of injecting a bit more 
inducement to invent would be through direct, government-sponsored 
financial incentives such as grants and tax benefits. 
¶15 The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 includes many 
direct, government-provided financial incentives to engage in scientific 
research associated with developing technologies to fight climate change.44  
However, the scope of these funds is limited to particular field of research 
and development.  Specifically, the legislation provides funding for research 
and development in: biofuels,45 solar energy,46 geothermal energy,47 marine 
and hydrokinetic energy,48 carbon capture and sequestration,49 and various 
other specific, small-scale areas of research.50 
¶16 Many other bills proposed in 2007 also involve limited availability 
of research funds.  The America’s Domestic Fuels Act, for instance, 
includes a grant to the Secretary of Energy for the specific purpose to study 
the “use of coal gasification as an energy source in ethanol production.”51  
                                                     
43 See NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 4, at 119 (“But regulation 
cannot be the sole policy egg in the global warming basket, for without 
investments to encourage technological breakthroughs, we won’t come close to 
achieving the emissions reductions we need to stabilize the climate.”). 
44 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 
Stat. 1492 (2007). 
45 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, §§ 207, 
221–34, 121 Stat. 1534–37 (2007). 
46 Solar Energy Research and Advancement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 
§§ 601–07, 121 Stat. 1675–78 (2007). 
47 Advanced Geothermal Energy Research and Development Act of 2007, Pub. 
L. No. 110-140, §§ 611–25, 121 Stat. 1679–85 (2007).  Geothermal energy 
involves the use of “heat energy stored in the Earth’s crust that can be accessed 
for direct use or electric power generation.”  Id. § 612(5). 
48 Marine and Hydrokinetic Renewable Energy Research and Development Act, 
Pub. L. No. 110-140, §§ 631–36, 121 Stat. 1687–89 (2007).  Marine and 
hydrokinetic energy includes energy derived from waves, tides, currents, free-
flowing water, and differentials in ocean temperatures.  Id. at § 632.  It excludes 
hydroelectric power coming from dams, etc.  Id. 
49 Department of Energy Carbon Capture and Sequestration Research, 
Development, and Demonstration Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, §§ 701–08 
121 Stat. 1704–09 (2007). 
50 See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, §§ 651–56, 121 Stat. 
1696–704 (2007). 
51 America’s Domestic Fuels Act, H.R. 931, 110th Cong. § 3(a) (2007). 
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Other proposals specify grants relating to research in:  geothermal energy,52 
clean coal,53 and ethanol.54  Some bills take the approach of the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 and provide for multiple areas of 
research.55  However, those bills limit funding to further advancement of 
existing technologies rather than encouraging revolutionary development.56   
¶17 Of the cap-and-trade proposals submitted in 2007, both the 
Lieberman-Warner57 and the Bingaman-Specter58 bills involve a direct 
investment in technological research.  Both plans allocate 28% of available 
funds to “advanced coal and [carbon dioxide] sequestration,”59 7% to 
“cellulosic biomass ethanol,”60 and 20% to “advanced technologies vehicle 
manufacturing.”61  In other words, more than half of available research goes 
towards advancing existing technologies.  For both bills, the remaining 45% 
is dedicated to support a “zero or low-carbon energy technologies 
program.”62 
¶18 This results-oriented zero or low-carbon energy technologies 
program provides financial incentives for those who develop new 
technologies that either result in zero or low-carbon energy solutions or in 
high-efficiency products.63  Programs such as these provide the best 
opportunity for direct government funds to result in the creation of new 
technologies.  Although funding specifically targeted to the further 
development of current technologies is certainly necessary, it is important to 
                                                     
52 Advanced Geothermal Energy Research and Development Act of 2007, H.R. 
2304, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007). 
53 Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 
2008, H.R. 2641, 110th Cong. tit. III (2007). 
54 Ethanol Infrastructure Expansion Act of 2007, S. 859, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007) 
(providing funds for “feasibility studies”). 
55 E.g., Renewable Fuels, Consumer Protection, and Energy Efficiency Act of 
2007, H.R. 2950, 110th Cong. (2007).  This bill grants funding for research in: 
bioenergy, id. § 122; renewable fuel, id. § 125; low-carbon fuels, id. § 132; 
lightweight material for vehicles, id. § 241; smart grid technology, id. § 256; 
marine and hydrokinetic renewable energy, id. § 292; carbon capture and 
storage, id. § 302; and green buildings, id. § 435. 
56 See supra note 55.  Although it provides money for a wide range of research 
projects, like the Renewable Fuels and Consumer Protection, the Energy 
Efficiency Act of 2007 does not give funding for advanced research into new 
solutions.  Id. 
57 See America’s Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007). 
58 See Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. (2007). 
59 S. 2191 § 4401(2)(A); S. 1766 § 401(a) (1)(B)(i).  
60 S. 2191 § 4401(2)(B); S. 1766 § 401(a)(1)(B)(ii).  The Bingaman-Specter bill 
also includes “municipal solid waste deployment” in this 7% group.  Id. 
61 S. 2191 § 4401(3); S. 1766 § 401(a)(1)(C). 
62 S. 2191 § 4401(1); S. 1766 § 401(a)(1)(A). 
63 S. 2191 § 4402(b); S. 1766 § 401(b)(2). 
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keep in mind the importance of encouraging the invention of breakthrough 
technologies that are essential to adequately deal with the climate crisis.  
Because revolutionary technologies by their very nature do not yet exist or 
are in conceptual infancy, their development via the method of direct, 
government-sponsored financial incentives should provide for flexibility in 
the scope of research.  The zero or low-carbon energy technologies program 
does this by attaching funding to the end result of lowering carbon emission 
rather than dictating the means by which this is to happen. 
¶19 Another cap-and-trade bill uses direct government funds with the 
purpose of promoting new technologies.  The McCain-Lieberman Climate 
Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007 establishes a “Climate Technology 
Financing Board.”64  This board is charged with providing financial 
assistance to those working to create new, innovative solutions to climate 
change.65  In determining which projects to fund, the Climate Technology 
Financing Board is to consider “the extent to which the project represents 
the construction of the first generation of facilities that use substantially 
new technology.”66  This provides incentives to invent new technologies.  
Furthermore, the program aims to speed the development of new 
technologies by focusing on projects that are in need of financial support 
beyond what the market will provide.  Specifically, the board must consider 
“the likelihood that assistance . . . would enable the project to proceed at an 
earlier date than the project would otherwise be able to proceed without 
such assistance” when selecting projects to fund.67   
IV. GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP 
¶20 Some degree of technological advancement is sure to result from 
any and all of the three methods mentioned previously.  However, the big 
question is whether those advancements will be enough to sufficiently 
address a problem that can easily turn into a crisis overnight.  Because 
climate change is such a unique problem with potentially catastrophic 
consequences, many commentators argue that nothing should be left to 
chance.68  Therefore, there are increasing calls for major government 
                                                     
64 Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 280, 110th Cong. § 251 
(2007). 
65 See id. §§ 251(a), 251(c)(2). 
66 Id. § 251(c)(2)(D). 
67 Id. § 251(c)(2)(C). 
68 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 163 
(2004); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST CASE SCENARIOS 119 (2007).  But see BJORN 
LOMBORG, COOL IT 123–24 (2007) (arguing that it is not worthwhile to plan for 
a catastrophe caused by climate change). 
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initiatives—beyond simple lawmaking and regulation—to spur 
technological development.69 
¶21 Existing federal law falls far short of establishing the major 
institutional measures that are called for by those advocating an Apollo-like 
approach to climate change.  For instance, although the principal 2007 
energy legislation takes some steps to encourage climate-related 
technological development, it provides for no major institutional changes.70  
Two cap-and-trade bills—Sanders-Boxer71 and Kerry-Snowe72—include an 
institutional apparatus that somewhat resembles the type of initiative needed 
to truly assist in the creation of breakthrough technologies, but falls far 
short of the ideal institutional structure.73 
¶22 Perhaps the closest thing to an Apollo proposal to come out of 
Congress is the establishment of an “Advanced Research Projects Agency – 
Energy” (ARPA-E)74  Modeled after the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA), ARPA-E simply aims “to overcome the long-
term and high-risk technological barriers in the development of energy 
technologies.”75  DARPA was created for the purpose of encouraging 
defense and military-related research and development.76  DARPA had 
many successes, including the development of crucial space technologies as 
well as the creation of the internet.77  ARPA-E is currently the climate 
change plan that best matches the type of institutional structure needed to 
meet Apollo-like standards.  However, as the ARPA-E proposal stands, it 
lacks many crucial characteristics that would be part of a truly effective 
institution of this category.78 
                                                     
69 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
70 See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text. 
71 Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act, S. 309, 110th Cong. (2007). 
72 Global Warming Reduction Act of 2007, S. 485, 110th Cong. (2007). 
73 Specifically, the R&D institution mentioned in these bills would be subsidiary 
to existing organizations and would be charged mainly with advancing existing 
technologies rather than encouraging revolutionary inventions.  S. 309 § 711; S. 
485 § 705. 
74 America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in 
Technology, Education, and Science Act, S. 761, 110th Cong. § 2005 (2007). 
75 Id. § 2005(b). 
76 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA Over the Years, 
http://www.darpa.mil/body/overtheyears.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2008). 
77 DARPA, DARPA’s 50th Anniversary, History, 
http://www.darpa.mil/DARPA50thevent/history.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2008). 
78 To truly be effective, a climate change equivalent to Apollo must be as 
expansive, goal-driven, and fully supported as the Kennedy-initiated lunar 
mission.  This will require a massive initiative involving the creation of a 
government climate institution analogous to NASA.  As with Apollo, it will also 
require strategic coordination with the private sector, academic institutions, and 
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¶23 California has established an institutional structure that comes close 
to fitting within this fourth category of climate change technology policies.  
The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 mandated the 
establishment of the Global Warming Economic and Technology 
Advancement Advisory Committee (ETAAC), a branch of the California 
Air Resources Board.79  The ETAAC is given the responsibility to: 
advise [the Air Resources Board] on activities that will facilitate 
investment in and implementation of technological research and 
development opportunities including, but not limited to, identifying 
new technologies, research, demonstration projects, funding 
opportunities, developing state, national, and international partnerships 
and technology transfer opportunities, and identifying and assessing 
research and advanced technology investment and incentive 
opportunities that will assist in the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions.80
The members of this committee have varied backgrounds and expertise.81  
They are appointed “based on their knowledge and expertise in fields of 
business, technology research and development, climate change, and 
economics.”82
¶24 The United States has a long history of investing enormously in 
scientific progress as a means of tackling crises.  For instance, faced with 
World War II security concerns, the U.S. initiated the Manhattan Project, a 
government-sponsored program charged with developing advanced nuclear 
                                                                                                                       
think tanks.  Under ARPA-E, entities in these sectors can qualify for grants and 
contracts, but would have little say in the agency itself. H.R. 364, 110th Cong. § 
2(d) (2007).  Unlike Apollo, the ideal climate change institutional structure will 
also require cooperation and coordination with actors beyond the U.S. borders.  
To be most effective, therefore, an Apollo project for climate change must not 
only involve a massive domestic effort, but must also allow for and encourage 
strong international collaboration.  ARPA-E falls short of this component since 
it does not explicitly provide for international coordination.  See id. § 2(f) 
(providing for coordination among federal entities but not mentioning 
international coordination). 
79 California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE div. 25.5, §§ 38500–99 (West 2007). 
80 Id. § 38591. 
81 See generally Cal. EPA Air Res. Bd., Economic and Technology 
Advancement Advisory Committee Members, 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/etaac/etaac_members.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2008) 
(providing biographical summaries of the members of ETAAC). 
82 Cal. EPA Air Res. Bd., Economic and Technology Advancement Advisory 
Committee (ETAAC), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/etaac/etaac.htm (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2008). 
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technology as quickly as possible.83  The urgency the world currently faces 
in avoiding an impending climate catastrophe parallels the urgency that the 
United States felt in the need to secure the capacity to build atomic bombs 
during World War II.84  The Manhattan Project was a bold, proactive 
response to the crisis.  The brightest minds were brought together, including 
thousands of scientists, engineers, and technicians.85  The project was 
enormous and “was directed to one overriding goal:  the production of 
nuclear weapons.”86 
¶25 Nevertheless, there are some clear differences between the 
Manhattan Project and the institutional composition of an analogous climate 
change program.  One major difference is that secrecy was paramount to the 
success of the Manhattan Project.87  Since climate change is by its very 
nature a global problem, there is no need to hide scientific findings and 
technological progress.  In fact, openness and collaboration will likely be 
beneficial in reaching solutions to the crisis.  In addition, the Manhattan 
Project was driven by a single technological goal, whereas for climate 
change, it is probably best to encourage the development of countless 
different types of technologies.  A large government apparatus worked for 
the narrow technological goal of creating an atomic weapon, but may not 
work as well in this situation.  In addition, such a massive government 
project may not be the most efficient way to accomplish the same results 
that could be achieved through the three more basic methods of encouraging 
technological progress.88 
¶26 Twenty years after the Manhattan Project, the United States 
government once again took decisive action in assisting in the creation of a 
technological breakthrough.  In 1961, President Kennedy announced a goal 
to send a man to the moon within a decade.89  Determined to succeed, the 
U.S. government established an institutional apparatus that would provide 
the best environment for the development of space technology.  NASA 
collaborated with private industry and university researchers in a nexus that 
“enable[d] the large-scale technological development needed for Project 
                                                     
83 See HUGHES, supra note 8, at 53. 
84 See id. at 53–55. 
85 Id. at 9. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 53. 
88 See Yang & Oppenheimer, supra note 10, at 200. 
89 President John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Urgent 
National Needs 4 (May 26, 1961), available at 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Spee
ches/JFK/Urgent+National+Needs+Page+4.htm (“I believe that this nation 
should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a 
man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth.”). 
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Apollo.”90  On July 20, 1969, Apollo XI landed on the moon, 
accomplishing Kennedy’s mission two years early.91 
¶27 As referenced earlier in this iBrief, the Apollo Program is a popular 
source of inspiration for climate change proposals.92  Despite this, most 
Apollo-like proposals appear to have only superficial similarities with the 
original Apollo Program.  For instance, the original Apollo was effective in 
part because it involved strategic coordination with the private sector, 
academic institutions, and think tanks.  Under ARPA-E, however, entities in 
these sectors have little say in the agency.93  
¶28 It is also questionable whether Apollo is actually an appropriate 
model to follow for climate change.  For example, unlike Apollo, the ideal 
climate change institutional structure will also require cooperation and 
coordination with actors beyond the U.S. borders.  Apollo was born as part 
of the Cold War space race between two nation-states.  It was in essence 
part of a giant contest between the two superpowers of the time.  The 
climate change crisis is fundamentally different in that the entire world risks 
impending peril from a global phenomenon.  To be most effective, 
therefore, an Apollo-like project for climate change must not only involve a 
massive domestic effort, but must also allow for and encourage strong 
international collaboration.  ARPA-E falls short of this component since it 
does not explicitly provide for international coordination.94 
¶29 Furthermore, most proposals selling themselves as “Apollo”-like 
also lack the necessary domestic and international scale and scope.95  In 
addition, the Apollo Program shared the Manhattan Project’s single-goal 
mission model.  As discussed earlier, climate change is different in that a 
multiple technologies solution is likely the best option, and it is unclear as 
to whether creating a massive government institution is the most effective 
way to accomplish this.  Moreover, it is questionable as to whether a 
government-controlled institution is the most efficient investment of 
resources if the same results can be reached under any of the three less 
intensive approaches to inducing technological advance. 
                                                     
90 Eligar Sadeh, Public Administration of the Space Program, in SPACE POLITICS 
AND POLICY, supra note 7, at 129, 143. 
91 NASA, The Apollo 11 Mission, 
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/history/apollo/apollo11/index.html (last visited Jan. 
22, 2008). 
92 See, e.g., HENDRICKS & INSLEE, supra note 6, at 2–3. 
93 See America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in 
Technology, Education, and Science Act, S. 761, 110th Cong. § 2005 (2007). 
94 See id. 
95 See, e.g., New Apollo Energy Act of 2007, H.R. 2809, 110th Cong. §§ 204, 
612 (2007). 
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CONCLUSION 
¶30 Technology is an essential component of any effective climate 
change solution.  The drivers of technological advancement can come from 
a range of policy methods.  The easiest strategy is to simply allow the free 
market system to work its course.  Private investors will continue to 
naturally be drawn to a growing market for clean technology.  As a second 
alternative, the government can encourage private investment by indirectly 
signaling the increasing value of clean technology under climate-friendly 
legal frameworks.  If costs are assigned to environmentally unsound 
practices, incentives will form to create technology that will allow for 
cheaper compliance to climate-friendly laws.  A third approach would be 
for the government to take a more proactive role in encouraging 
technological advancement by directly funding research and development.  
To this point, clean technology has been driven by these three types of 
tactics. 
¶31 Recently, however, there have been calls for a more intensive 
government-initiated method: establishing a specialized institutional 
structure to focus on the development of revolutionary technological 
solutions to climate change.  The United States has done this in the past to 
meet exceptional scientific challenges.  Both the Manhattan Project and the 
Apollo Program were successful in meeting their extraordinary goals.  
However, comparisons to Manhattan and Apollo only go so far.  It is 
questionable as to whether a similar massive government initiative is the 
most appropriate way to encourage climate change technological 
development.   
¶32 In short, a wide array of policy options is available to spur the 
creation of clean technology.  Relying solely on market forces will likely be 
insufficient, and establishing a large-scale Apollo-like project for energy is 
controversial and has some drawbacks.  The best policy option likely 
involves a blend of all four types of policies, with more of a concentration 
on the second and third categories—indirect and direct government 
encouragement of technological development through climate change 
legislation. 
